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## Henri Temianka Correspondence; (lte)

Henri Temianka

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## Henri Temianka Correspondence; (lte)

### **Description**

This collection contains material pertaining to the life, career, and activities of Henri Temianka, violin virtuoso, conductor, music teacher, and author. Materials include correspondence, concert programs and flyers, music scores, photographs, and books.

### **Keywords**

Henri Temianka, culture, virtuosity in musical performance, violinist, chamber music, press, November 18, 1981, discontent

November 18, 1981

Letters to the Editor  
The Los Angeles Times  
Times Mirror Square  
Los Angeles, CA 90053

Dear Sir:

Senator George McGovern sounds like a well-intentioned man but he urgently needs to take a crash course in history and geography before writing any further pieces on the Palestinian issue. It requires only one brief glance at the map to realize that the Arab Empire stretches for thousands of miles from Morocco in the west to Saudi Arabia, Iraq and other countries beyond them in the east, a total area several times larger than the United States. One has to strain one's eyesight to detect on that same map the tiny speck of land called Israel. Its size is comparable to a mole on the jaws of a hippopotamus.

In 1948, when the Jewish state was established, not a single Arab was displaced. Arab Armies invaded the fledgling state from all sides in an attempt to destroy it. They failed, as we know, but in the process deliberately panicked many Palestinians to flee.

From then until 1967, the Israelis did not occupy the Sinai, the West Bank or Gaza. Did the Arabs leave them in peace? Of course not. The efforts to destroy Israel went on relentlessly.

After the Camp David accord, Israel, in an act of generosity that may be unparalleled in history, returned to Egypt the Sinai with its vital oil resources.

Even if Israel were to be wiped off the map tomorrow, nothing would be solved. Hostility towards Israel is the glue that keeps the Arab Nations together. Without it, the resulting Middle East conflagration



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will make the present situation look like child's play.

McGovern's description of Saudi Arabia as a good and helpful friend makes one blush with embarrassment. The medieval despots who are ruling that country must be cackling with glee, along with their honored house guest Idi Amin.

Yours sincerely,

HENRI TEMIANKA

HT/gv



# Palestinian Issue: the Key to Peace

## Settlement Would End Most Important Middle East Trouble

By GEORGE MCGOVERN

In the aftermath of the murder of President Anwar Sadat of Egypt, American leaders and opinion makers were shocked into re-examining the bases of American power and interest in the Middle East. It's about time.

It used to be said that American interests in the Middle East relied on four pillars of power: Israel, the Shah of Iran, Anwar Sadat's Egypt and Saudi Arabia, the last being included for the compelling reason that it possesses 25% of the world's oil. According to the theory of the "four pillars," the industrial world's need for oil, the American moral commitment to Israel and protection of everybody against Soviet designs could all be taken care of if the regional parties would simply recognize that their own differences were trivial compared to the overarching strategic necessities, as perceived in the United States. Thus, Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national-security adviser, spoke in sweeping terms of an "arc of crisis," although it should be noted that, of recent Administrations, only Carter's showed real appreciation of the importance of regional issues and aspirations in the Middle

Then the shah fell—primarily for domestic reasons, which undoubtedly were exacerbated by an extravagant military relationship with the United States. The Reagan Administration, however, stopping only to blame Carter for the fall of the shah, set out to build around the remaining three pillars a "strategic consensus" against the Soviet Union.

Thus far, the effort has failed—and I venture to predict that it will continue to fail—for reasons well known to anyone passingly acquainted with the Middle East.

The first, general, reason is that all parties in the region, despite what they tell the United States, are more concerned with one another than they are with the Soviet Union. In the Middle East as elsewhere, it has been well-known for years that inflamed anti-Sovietism is the way to Uncle Sam's heart—and also to his pocketbook. I believe this is true for Israel just as I believe it was true for Sadat.

The second, more specific, reason that "strategic consensus" is dead in the water and likely to remain so is that there is no possibility—none whatsoever—of any kind of cooperation, however veiled or indirect, between Saudi Arabia and Israel as long as the Palestinian problem remains unre-

The assassination of Sadat prompted assertions that, with a "second pillar" gone and with Saudi Arabia both hostile to Israel and alleged to be internally unstable, there was nothing left for the United States to do but to place sole reliance on Israel as the mainstay of American interests in the Middle East.

Now I happen to believe—even though many Israelis do not—that the United States will never sell out Israel. Israel is an integral part of the moral-cultural world environment in which Americans wish to live, and that is a far more solid guarantee than even the most highly developed "strategic relationship" is likely to provide.

The theory of the "four pillars," which was unsound to begin with, is, if possible, even more so today. It is unsound because it offers a one-dimensional view of "strategic reality" as the only reality, and because of its blind indifference to galvanizing regional forces, such as the ideology of Arab and Islamic solidarity and Palestinian nationalism.

A soundly based American policy must be multi-dimensional. In the case of Israel, this would necessitate a continuing commitment to Israeli security, empathy with Israel's fears and sympathy for its hopes. But we must also make it clear to Israel that the United States has other interests in the region, and that it cannot and will not permit these to be jeopardized.

In the case of Saudi Arabia, which has been a good and faithful friend to the United States in all important respects except for its dissent from the Camp David agreements between Israel and Egypt, we must learn to forbear in areas where our pressures can bring no good result. I do not know whether the Saudis, in their heart of hearts, wish that they could help the Camp David process along. I do know, however, that the leaders of Saudi Arabia are prudent men who have accommodated the United States on oil production and prices and who firmly believe that, if anything in the world is likely to

make them vulnerable to the fate that befell the shah, it is the crushing embrace of the United States and, by extension, Israel. We frequently ask our friends abroad to appreciate and respect the political restraints on our policy; it is entirely reasonable that we should do the same for them.

The heart of the matter is and always has been the Palestinian question. That, more than anything, is what has kept the Middle East in turmoil, divided the Arab world against itself and robbed Israel of the security and repose it has dreamed of for 30 years. The Palestinian question was also, in a fundamental sense, the undoing of Sadat. After his trip to Jerusalem on Nov. 19, 1977, he bore the stigma of having "sold out" the "Arab nation" in a separate peace.

A general settlement based on the right of unencumbered Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank and Gaza would not put an end to all the troubles of the Middle East, but it would put an end to the most important of them. For the Palestinians it would go far to redress a historic injustice. For the Israelis—if they could bring themselves to take what they understandably perceive as a great risk—it could be the beginning of the "real peace" that has eluded them since 1948.

Finally, and not least, there could be no greater tribute to the memory of Anwar Sadat than a settlement based on the principles he outlined on that memorable day in Jerusalem.

*Former Sen. George McGovern (D-S.D.) is chairman of the Washington-based Americans for Common Sense.*

